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TOURO LAW REVIEW
on a breaking and entering charge, signed written admissions
after being interrogated on suspicion of murder. 1957 The United
States Supreme Court refused to suppress these statements since
no formal murder charges had been initiated against the
defendant. 1958 If the Moran Court could not find that formal
proceedings had begun, then applying federal law to the instant
case, defendant in Caviano could not sustain a claim that formal
proceedings had been initiated where he was only questioned on
the alleged violation. Therefore, defendant's statements were
clearly not protected under either the Federal or State
Constitutions.
CRIMINAL DIVISION
BRONX COUNTY
People v. Rivera1 959
(decided November 22, 1993)
Defendant, Ernesto Rivera, in a "hybrid form of
representation" 1960 attempted to proceed pro se and have his
criminal indictment dismissed, based on New York's speedy trial
provision. 1961 The court had to determine under what
1957. Id. at 417.
1958. Id. at 430-3 1.
1959. _ Misc. 2d _, 605 N.Y.S.2d 822 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1993).
1960. Id. at _, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 822. Hybrid representation occurs where a
defendant proceeds pro se and also receives standby counsel. Id. at _, 605
N.Y.S.2d at 823.
1961. Id. at , 605 N.Y.S.2d at 822; see also N.Y. GRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 30.30 (McKinney 1992). This section states in part:
1. Except as otherwise provided in subdivision three, a motion made
pursuant to paragraph (e) of subdivision one of section 170.30 or
paragraph (g) of subdivision one of section 210.20 must be granted
where the people are not ready for trial within:
(a) six months of the commencement of a criminal action
wherein a defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at
least one of which is a felony;
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circumstances a criminal defendant had a constitutional right to
make a pro se motion, notwithstanding the fact that he was
represented by competent counsel. 1962
On appeal, the New York Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's refusal to entertain Mr. Rivera's pro se motion. The court
based its decision on the satisfactory inquiry made by the court to
his trial counsel, and on the needless burden placed upon the
criminal justice system by the defendant's "frivolous pro se
motions." 1963 The court also served notice that attorneys who
support such "frivolous pro se motions" in the future might well
be sanctioned. 1964
In reaching its decision, the New York Supreme Court applied
the criteria set forth in People v. Renaud. 1965 Renaud demands
that in situations in which a represented defendant seeks to make
a pro se motion, the trial court must inquire whether counsel has
knowledge of the motion, has belief in the motion's merit, or has
(b) ninety days of the commencement of a criminal action
wherein a defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at
least one of which is a misdemeanor punishable by a sentence
of imprisonment of more than three months and none of
which is a felony;
(c) sixty days of the commencement of a criminal action wherein
the defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one
of which is a misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of
imprisonment of not more than three months and none of
which is a crime punishable by a sentence of imprisonment
of more than three months;
(d) thirty days of the commencement of a criminal action
wherein the defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at
least one of which is a violation and none of which is a
crime.
Id.
1962. Rivera, __ Misc. 2d at , 605 N.Y.S.2d at 823-25.
1963. Id. at ___,605 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
1964. Id. at _, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
1965. 145 A.D.2d 367, 535 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1st Dep't 1988). The appellate
division vacated and reversed defendant's conviction based on the trial court's
failure to rule on his pro se motion to dismiss, or to even inquire into whether
defendant's attorney was aware of such motion. Id. at 367-68, 535 N.Y.S.2d
at 988.
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any conflict with the criminal defendant. 1966 In Rivera, the court
found that although aware of Mr. Rivera's pro se motion to
dismiss the indictment, trial counsel neither agreed with nor
adopted that motion. 1967 Indeed, by conferring with the
defendant, as well as her supervisor about the speedy trial
motion, "counsel complied with both her fiduciary duty to her
client and her ethical obligation as an officer of the court to
refrain from frivolous arguments." 1968 In analyzing the third
Renaud inquiry concerning any conflict between the defendant
and his trial counsel, the supreme court noted that not only did
Rivera fail to allege any conflict, but there existed no reasonable
basis for a conflict claim. 1969 Thus, the test set forth in Renaud
was satisfied at Mr. Rivera's trial.
This case, therefore, remains true to the Renaud decision that
frivolous pro se motions can be constitutionally denied, once a
proper inquiry is made regarding trial counsel. In this manner,
care is taken to strike a delicate balance between trial counsel's
obligations to both the client and the legal system. 1970
On the federal level, in Faretta v. California,1971 the Supreme
Court held that a defendant can waive the right to counsel if it is
done "knowingly and intelligently." 1972 Once such a waiver is
made, the Sixth Amendment 1973 prevents a state from imposing
counsel upon that defendant. 1974 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court held that it is not a constitutional violation for a trial court
to appoint "standby counsel[," 1975 even when that standby
counsel engages in unsolicited courtroom participation, 1976
1966. Id. at _, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
1967. Rivera, __ Misc. 2d at _, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
1968. Id. at ,605 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
1969. Id. at 605 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
1970. Id. at , 605 N.Y.S.2d at 824-25.
1971. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
1972. Id. at 835 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938)).
1973. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
have Assistance of Counsel for his defense." Id.
1974. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836.
1975. Id. at 834 n.46. "Of course, a State may - even over objection by the
accused - appoint a 'standby counsel' to aid the accused if and when the
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Moreover, the United States Supreme Court, in Anders v.
California,1977 noted that the duty of counsel "requires that he
support his clienti] ... to the best of his ability."1 978 However,
the Supreme Court also stated that "[f]or judges to second guess
reasonable professional judgments and impose on appointed
counsel a duty to raise every 'colorable' claim suggested by a
client would disserve the very goal of vigorous and effective
advocacy that underlies Anders." 1979
In comparing the state and federal standards, it appears that
waiver of counsel is easier under a federal standard than the state
standard. New York state will first make a determination as to
whether the decision to appear pro se is frivolous or not before
allowing a waiver of the constitutional right to be represented by
counsel.
CRIMINAL TERM
KINGS COUNTY
People v. Richardson1 980
(decided September 20, 1993)
The criminal defendant, an indigent, requested the court to
appoint counsel, on a motion to vacate a judgment. 1981 The court
accused requests help, and to be available to represent the accused in the event
that termination of the defendant's self-representation is necessary." Id. at 835
n.46 (quoting United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1124-26 (D.C. Cir.
1972)).
1976. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 187 n.17 (1984).
1977. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
1978. Id. at 744.
1979. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 754 (1983).
1980. 159 Misc. 2d 167, 603 N.Y.S.2d 700 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1993).
1981. Id. at 167, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 701; see also N.Y. CRIN. PROC. LAw
§ 440.10 (McKinney 1993). The statute provides in relevant part:
1. At any time after the entry of a judgment, the court in which it
was entered may, upon motion of the defendant, vacate such
judgment upon the ground that:
(a) The court did not have jurisdiction of the action or of the
person of the defendant; or
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